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Abstract
Do French Students really bid sincerely in real and hypothetical incentive compatible auctions?
Recent evidence suggests they do, which goes counter to most observed bidding behavior in the
United States, and supports the idea that cultural differences may explain bidding behavior more
than economic circumstances. Herein we run a robustness check by exploring bidding behavior in
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1 Introduction
Hypothetical Bias (HB) arises whenever elicited preferences are different depending on whether the
elicitation method has monetary consequences or not. The accumulated evidence, mainly from lab
experiments, leads Harrison and Rutström (2006) to claim “that the evidence strongly favours the con-
clusion that hypothetical bias exists”, which undercuts the basic foundations of popular state preference
valuation methods used in cost-benefit analyses. Recent work, however, finds evidence to suggest cul-
tural differences might be driving why hypothetical bias is not observed in every nation. For example,
Emheke et al. (2007) implemented the same referendum lab valuation experiment in China, France,
Niger and the United States. They find that US subjects (Indiana and Kansas) exhibit a significant HB;
but subjects in China and Niger are likely to exhibit a ’negative’ HB; and finally, French subjects (from
Grenoble) are the least prone to HB.
The open question we address in this paper is whether their French results are robust. Our work
extends Ehmke, Lusk, and List (2007) results in three key ways. First, we assess the robustness of
such idiosyncratic behavior by eliciting values in two of the largest cities – Paris and Lyon. Second,
we examine robustness of HB using the classic second-price auction with induced values rather than a
referendum with home-grown values. Finally, we use a between-subjects protocol that prevents order
effects than can arise in a within-subjects protocol. Our results unambiguously confirm that the incentive
context – real or hypothetical – is neutral on French bidders’ behavior. French bidders pay what they
say.
2 The experiment
2.1 Experimental design
Our experiment explores the robustness of hypothetical bias in two locations in France. We induce
people to reveal their preferences for a good using a Vickrey auction with induced values under real and
hypothetical treatments.1
Following standard procedures, an unspecified “good” is sold in a Vickrey second-price auction: the
highest bidder wins and pays the second-highest bidder’s bid. An auction has 9 bidders each endowed
1The Vickrey auction with induced values is one of the most standard institution used in the literature dealing with
valuation experiments. Examples include McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey (1993), Frykblom (2000) or Cherry, Frykblom,
Shogren, List, and Sullivan (2004). The success of the Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961) stems from its revelation property.
Theory shows that without an outside option, a rational bidder’s dominant strategy is to bid his induced value. In addition,
experimental evidence confirms that the second-price auction performs reasonably well in revealing preferences for both
induced and non-induced values auctions (see Kagel 1995).
2
with a unique induced value – i.e. the price at which the bidder can sell the good to the monitor after
the auction (see, e.g., Kagel 1995). The induced demand curve is identical in all auctions and is defined
by: {84; 76; 71; 68; 65; 63; 53; 38; 24}. All monetary values are expressed in ecu (Experimental Currency
Unit). The auction is repeated over 9 periods, implementing all possible permutations between individual
private values. Each participant experiences only once each private value; and the whole demand curve is
induced in every period. Although the repetition is deterministic, we avoid end-game effect by providing
the subjects with no information on that point – except for the repetition itself. The bidders do not
know the other bidders’ induced value or the induced demand curve. A bidding period ends when every
bidder has chosen a bid between 0 and 100. At the end of the period, subjects are privately informed
about whether they win the auction (along with the price paid in this case), their gain for the period
and, lastly, whether a new auction period is about to start.
In both the real and hypothetical treatment, each subject receives a 10¤ show-up/participation fee.
In the real treatment, the ecu accumulated earnings across all auction periods are added to this fee –
would it happen, negative total earnings would decrease the show up fee up to 5¤.2 In contrast, only the
fee is paid under the hypothetical treatment. This is made common knowledge by stating explicitly in the
oral and written instructions that payments are either constant (hypothetical) or depend on decisions
made in each period (real). Details about the nature of the monetary earnings is the only difference
between the instructions used in both conditions.
2.2 Experimental procedure
We ran six sessions in the two largest French cities: Paris and Lyon. In Paris, we ran three hypothetical
sessions, and one real at the University of Paris 1, in the Parisian Experimental Economics Labora-
tory; in Lyon, we ran one Hypothetical and one Real session at the GATE laboratory, University of
Lyon.3 Each session used 18 subjects separated into two distinct 9-bidder auctions. Overall, 108 subjects
participated to the different sessions. Participants were first to third-year undergraduate students in law,
economics or chemistry. The experiment was computerized using a software developed under Regate
(Zeiliger 2000).
All practical conditions were kept constant in the two locations. Recruitment was internet-based and
all email-messages were harmonized. The two experimental labs are set identically, with wood separation
between computers, organized in rows. One monitor ran all sessions and used identical procedures and
words in welcoming the participants and describing the experiment.
A typical session proceeds as follows. First, each subject signs an individual consent form before
2This lower bound stems from the way participants are recruited: we contractually commit ourselves to a minimum
earning equal to 5¤.
3For more information, see http://leep.univ-paris1.fr/ and http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/
3
entering the lab and assigned randomly to a computer. Next the written instructions, based on Cherry
et al. (2004)’ instructions, are distributed and read aloud.4 The monitor uses both a non-numerical
example and quiz to highlight the most salient features of the design. The experiment begins only
once every question has been privately answered. Finally, participants are encouraged to ask clarifying
questions before starting the experiment.
The experiment begins by asking the subjects to fill out a computerized questionnaire about socio-
economic characteristics (gender, sex,. . . ). Next the auction is introduced. In each round, the winning
bidder’s profits equal the difference between his or her induced value and the price he or she pays for the
good (the second highest bid). For the 8 non-winning bidders, their profits are zero for that round. Only
the winner sees the two highest bids at the end of the round. At the end of the experiment, subjects are
privately paid their monetary payoff in cash - (1) 10¤ in the hypothetical condition, or (2) computed as
the sum of this fee and the profits/losses ecu accumulated in the real condition. The common knowledge
exchange rate was 3ecu for 1¤. The experiment last around half an hour and the average gain is 10
Euros.5
3 Results
We first consider aggregate behavior by round and induced value in each treatment, real and hypothetical.
Two results emerge. First, at the aggregate level, we find no hypothetical bias. No differences arise
between elicited demands in the real or hypothetical contexts. Second, at the individual level, we find
no evidence of hypothetical bidding. We conduct an econometric analysis finding both the slope and the
constant of the bidding regression line are not significantly different if bids are elicited with or without
monetary incentives.
First, consider the aggregate results. Table 1 illustrates bidding behavior at the aggregate level by
round and treatment. Results suggest an absence of hypothetical bias. Strictly rational bidding in real
and hypothetical treatments would result in the elicitation of 542× 9 = 4878 ECU. Adding up the bids
in each of the auction in the real context, we elicit in total 5241 (119.4%) and 5087 (112.0%)ECU in
Paris and 4989 (99.3%) and 5049 (103.5%) ECU in Lyon. In the hypothetical context, elicited aggregate
demands range from 4763 (97.6%) to 5475 ECU (112.2%).
When looking at the different rounds, 75.0% of the elicited aggregate demands in the real context
are in the 90%-110% interval, and this percentage increases to 91% when considering the 80%-120%
interval. In the hypothetical context, 52.8% of these elicited aggregate demands are in the 90%-110%
range and 86.1% when considering the 80%-120% interval.
4An English translation of the original instructions in French is provided in Appendix A.
5Minimum hourly wage was 6.50 Euros at the time of the experiment (source: http://www.urssaf.fr).
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We now consider the aggregate bidding behavior by induced value and treatment condition. In
Table 2, we added up the bids in sorting by induced value for each of the treatments. Examining Table 2
suggests that real and hypothetical treatments perform equally well in the aggregate when considering
the induced value level. Results show that elicited demands match in aggregate the induced demand6
for almost all the induced values in both treatments. Elicited demand when considering only the lowest
induced value (24 ECU) are more likely to exceed induced demand. For this particular value, we elicit
from 106.0% to 164% of induced demand in the real condition while in the hypothetical we elicit from
94.9% to 176.4%.
Table 3: Random-effects Tobit regression
Coefficient Estimated p−value
parameter
α -4.97 0.113
αH 3.84 0.273
β 0.92 0.000
βH -0.04 0.490
φ2 6.99 0.000
φ3 11.84 0.000
φ4 12.14 0.000
φ5 12.04 0.000
φ6 14.45 0.000
φ7 15.42 0.000
φ8 14.31 0.000
φ9 14.83 0.000
σα 7.45 0.000
σ 14.16 0.000
Loglikelihood -3905.009
Note: n = 972 observations. 3 observations are left cen-
sored, 918 uncensored and 51 right censored.
We now focus on bidding behavior at the individual level. We test for hypothetical bias, using a
panel tobit model censored at 0 and 100 (Cherry et al. 2004):
bit = βνit + βHHY Pi × νit + αi + αHHY Pi + φt + it (1)
where bit denotes subject i’s ECU bid in trial t; νit denotes subject i’s induced value in trial t. The term
αi represents subject-specific characteristics and is decomposed in a constant term α and a random effect
term αi of mean zero and variance σ2α standing for individual heterogeneity. Trial-specific effects φt are
introduced as dummies in the regression. HY Pi is a dummy variable which equals one when the bid is
elicited in the hypothetical context. The parameter αH associated with HY Pi accounts for the effect of
the hypothetical condition on the constant term of the bidding regression line while βH accounts for its
effect on the slope of the regression line. Finally, it is bid error with mean zero and variance σ2 .
6Aggregate demands for each induced value are given in the second line of the Table.
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We test hypothetical bias by testing the joint nullity of the coefficients αH and βH . Table 3 presents
the results (the constant term contains the mean individual effect and round 1 time-effect). Econometric
results shows that parameters associated with the hypothetical condition are not different from zero when
tested separately: p = .273 for αH and p = .490 for βH . We also conduct a joint nullity test of αH
and βH using a LR test. The LR test cannot reject the joint nullity of both parameters (LR=2.00 with
p = 0.368). The econometric model that analyses bidding behavior at the individual level therefore
confirms what has been shown at the aggregate level–the absence of an hypothetical bias in our data.
4 Conclusion
Do cultural differences generate different behavior when people reveal their preferences? The results in
Ehmke et al. (2007) suggest “yes” – in a referendum experiment, they found a ’negative’ hypothetical
bias in China and Niger, and no hypothetical bias in France. Herein we explore whether this French
result was robust to changes in location and allocation institution. We implement a classic Vickrey
auction in Paris and Lyon using an experimental design shown to induce hypothetical bias in the United
States (Cherry et al. 2004).
Our results are two-fold. First, French subjects bid their induced value – the Vickrey auction worked
as a demand revealing mechanism. Although the results are weaker at low induced values, these results
do not contradict other laboratory valuation experiments using the same experimental setting (see, in
particular, Cherry et al. 2004; Shogren et al. 2001). Second, we find no evidence of hypothetical bias.
This result supports the findings for French people in Ehmke et al. (2007).
Ehmke et al. (2007) explain their results by speculating that differences must exist between individ-
ualist and collectivist societies to the extent that people in collectivist societies are more bound in their
behaviour by social rules and norms. The implication is that both society types use distinct “templates”
to guide the choice of their actions in hypothetical situations. Perhaps-our results only support the idea
that French subjects do not seem to have a problem with insincere bidding and hypothetical bias. Future
research will have to explore the inventory of possible sincere bidding and real-hypothetical templates
that might exist across different cultures. For example, Henrich et al. (2001) argue that “the degree
of cooperation, sharing, and punishment exhibited by experimental subjects [in social dilemmas experi-
ments] closely corresponds to templates for these behaviors in the subjects’ daily lives” (p.76). For our
results, the explanation of people’s behaviour in the hypothetical situation would reduce to identifying
the template(s) associated with behavior beyond purely economic incentives.
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A Supplementary material: Instructions
[The instructions reported below are used for the Hypothetical treatment. The changes implemented
according to the treatment appears in brackets.]
You’re involved in an experiment in which you can earn money. The amount you will earn [Real:
will depend on your own decisions as well as the decisions of other participants] is fixed and does not
depend on your decisions during the experiment.
Before starting the experiment, we will ask you to answer a few questions aimed at knowing you
better (your age, your gender, your work occupation, . . . ). All those informations [Real: as well
as your monetary earnings] will be kept anonymous and confidential.
Experiment proceeding
At the beginning of the experiment, two groups involving 9 participants are made. Each partic-
ipant belongs to the same group during the whole experiment.
Overview. You will be participating in an auction in which you are buyer. The currency unit used in
the auction is the ecu (Experimental Currency Unit). [Real: Its value in Euros is described at the end
of the instructions]. The amount of ecu you earn during the experiment has no consequence
on your monetary payoff. You will submit a bid in ecu to acquire one unit of the good that the
experiment monitor will re-acquire from you. There will be several rounds of bidding. [Real: The
outcome of each auction in each round directly influences how much you will get paid at the end of the
experiment.]
Each round proceeding
Each round has 8 steps.
Step 1. Each bidder looks at his or her resale value on his or her screen. recording sheet for this round.
We label resale value the price in ecu the monitor will pay to buy back a unit of the good that
is purchased in the auction. The resale values of different participants in a group can be
different. Once you looked at your resale value, press the OK button;
Step 2. Each bidder then submits a bid in ecu to buy one unit of the good. To this matter, move the
scroll bar until you see the price you want to submit. Then press the OK button below the scroll
bar to confirm your choice;
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Step 3. The monitor ranks the bids from highest to lowest. For instance:
n◦ 1 fs.l ecu Highest bid
n◦ 2 df.g ecu
n◦ 3 za.f ecu
n◦ 4 sc.d ecu
n◦ 5 qs.a ecu
n◦ 6 nj.h ecu
n◦ 7 hh.m ecu
n◦ 8 ht.t ecu
n◦ 9 ky.l ecu Lowest bid
Step 4. The second highest bid (bid n◦2) determines the market price. In the above example, the second
highest bid is df.g ecu then the market price would be et df.g ecu:
n◦ 1 fs.l ecu
n◦ 2 df.g ecu Second highest bid: market price
n◦ 3 za.f ecu
n◦ 4 sc.d ecu
n◦ 5 qs.a ecu
n◦ 6 nj.h ecu
n◦ 7 hh.m ecu
n◦ 8 ht.t ecu
n◦ 9 ky.l ecu
Step 5. The buyer who bid the highest price (the buyer ranked n◦1) purchases one unit of the good at the
market price. In the above example the buyer who bid fs.l ecu purchases one unit of the good
that costs df.g ecu.
Step 6. Buyer n◦1 then sells the unit back to the monitor. The price of this transaction is the resale value
listed for that round on his/her screen. The profit in ecu the bidder n◦1 earns for that round is
the difference between the resale value and the market price:
profit = Resale value - market price
Important remark. You can have negative profits: if you buy a unit of the good and the resale
value is less than the market price, your profits will be negative.
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Step 7. All bidders at or below the market price (buyers n◦2 to n◦9) do not buy anything, they make
zero profit for that round.
Step 8. End of the round. You profit in ecu in that round appears on your screen. Press the OK button
once you read it. On your screen appears whether: a new round is about to start; or the experiment
is over.
How will you take your decisions?
Your screen is divided into three areas:
In the upper part are displayed all the information you need to take your decisions.
The middle part allows you to take your decisions, by pressing on the displayed buttons.
The bottom part reminds you with your past decisions and profits..
Payment of your earnings
[Real: At the end of the experiment, we compute the sum of your profits in ecu across rounds. If your
profit in a given round is negative, the total decreases ; if your profit in a given round is positive, the
total increases. This total is converted into you Euros according to the rate: 3 ecu = 1 ¤. A fixed
fee equal to 10¤is added to this payoff.] Your payoff for participating in the experiment is a fixed fee
equal to 10¤. You will be paid privately the corresponding monetary payoff in cash at the end of the
experiment.
Please do not talk and try not to communicate with any other subject during the experiment. I you
communicate, you will be asked to leave and forfeit any money earned. it is very important you correctly
understand the instructions. If you have a question, please raise your hand, someone will come to give
you answers. Please follow these instructions.
Thanks for participating.
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B Supplementary material: Questionnaire
1. Groups are rematched in each round.
2YES 2NO
2. Each group involves participants.
3. At the beginning of each round, all participants belonging to my group are attributed the same
resale value.
2YES 2NO
4. When I make a bid, I can bid any amount I wish.
2YES 2NO
5. The market price is set by the bid of the second highest bidder in my group.
2YES 2NO
6. If my bid is the highest bid and is equal to RR.U ecu and the second highest bid in my group is
GG.K ecu, then I buy the unit of the good.
2YES 2NO
If YES, I pay: for the good.
7. If I purchase a unit of the good and my resale value is greater than the market price, I will make
positive profits.
2YES 2NO
8. The monetary payoff I will be paid at the end of the experiment depends on the amount of ecu I
earned in the auction.
2YES 2NO
If you are surprised by some answers, please ask questions.
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